2018-IPG-39 (NEW RESENTENCING PROVISIONS OF PC § 1170(d)(1))
November 2, 2018
2018-IPG-39 (NEW RESENTENCING PROVISIONS OF PC § 1170(d)(1))
This IPG discusses two new laws (one that went into effect in late June of 2018 (AB 1812) and one going into effect in early January of 2019 (AB 2942). AB 1812 made changes to Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) allowing courts, upon recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) or the Board of Parole Hearings (or the county correctional administrator in the case of county jail inmates) to resentence defendants and modify judgments, including judgments entered after a plea agreement, at any time and in any case. AB 2942 will allow district attorneys to recommend resentencing under that section as well. The potentially wide-ranging impact of these changes is explored.
2018-IPG-39 (NEW RESENTENCING PROVISIONS OF PC § 1170(d)(1) - PDF VERSION
November 2, 2018
2018-IPG-39 (NEW RESENTENCING PROVISIONS OF PC § 1170(d)(1))
This IPG discusses two new laws (one that went into effect in late June of 2018 (AB 1812) and one going into effect in early January of 2019 (AB 2942). AB 1812 made changes to Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) allowing courts, upon recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) or the Board of Parole Hearings (or the county correctional administrator in the case of county jail inmates) to resentence defendants and modify judgments, including judgments entered after a plea agreement, at any time and in any case. AB 2942 will allow district attorneys to recommend resentencing under that section as well. The potentially wide-ranging impact of these changes is explored.
2018-IPG-38 (OBTAINING CELL SITE INFO: CARPENTER) PDF VERSION
August 7, 2018
2018-IPG-38 (OBTAINING CELL SITE INFO: CARPENTER)
This IPG discusses the United States Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. United States (2018) 138 S.Ct. 2206, a case deciding whether a warrant is required to obtain cell site location information (CSLI), and its potential impact on law enforcement’s ability to obtain CSLI. Among the issues discussed: (i) Does this decision have any real impact on the ability of law enforcement in California to obtain CSLI without a warrant – considering that the California Electronic Communication Privacy Act already generally requires a warrant for electronic communication information? (ii) Will this decision impact a prosecutor’s ability to subpoena third party records in general when a defendant has a privacy interest in the third-party records? (iii) If exigent circumstances exist, can the government obtain either historical or real-time CSLI without a warrant?
2018-IPG-38 (OBTAINING CELL SITE INFO: CARPENTER)
August 6, 2018
This IPG discusses the United States Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. United States (2018) 138 S.Ct. 2206, a case deciding whether a warrant is required to obtain cell site location information (CSLI), and its potential impact on law enforcement’s ability to obtain CSLI. Among the issues discussed: (i) Does this decision have any real impact on the ability of law enforcement in California to obtain CSLI without a warrant – considering that the California Electronic Communication Privacy Act already generally requires a warrant for electronic communication information? (ii) Will this decision impact a prosecutor’s ability to subpoena third party records in general when a defendant has a privacy interest in the third-party records? (iii) If exigent circumstances exist, can the government obtain either historical or real-time CSLI without a warrant?
2018-IPG-37 (LIMITS ON PROSECUTORIAL CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTED & UNREPRESENTED PERSONS)
July 12, 2018
2018-IPG-37 (LIMITS ON PROSECUTORIAL CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTED & UNREPRESENTED PERSONS)
In this edition of the Inquisitive Prosecutors Guide, we discuss the barriers the Sixth and Fifth Amendment impose on prosecutorial contact with represented persons as well as the new rules of professional conduct governing contact by attorneys with represented and unrepresented persons (California Rules of Professional Conduct [“CRPC”] Rules 4.2, 4.3, and subdivisions (b) and (c) of Rule 3.8) going into effect in November of this year. Among the questions discussed: When can prosecutors or law enforcement contact persons whose Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached? When can prosecutors or law enforcement re-contact persons whose Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been invoked during custodial interrogation? Does new CPRC rule 4.2 change the currently existing rule (CPRC 2-100) governing contact with represented persons in any significant way? And when can prosecutors communicate with charged but unrepresented persons and/or negotiate plea bargains with such persons?
2018-IPG-37 (LIMITS ON PROSECUTORIAL CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTED & UNREPRESENTED PERSONS) PDF VERSION
July 12, 2018
2018-IPG-37 (LIMITS ON PROSECUTORIAL CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTED & UNREPRESENTED PERSONS)
In this edition of the Inquisitive Prosecutors Guide, we discuss the barriers the Sixth and Fifth Amendment impose on prosecutorial contact with represented persons as well as the new rules of professional conduct governing contact by attorneys with represented and unrepresented persons (California Rules of Professional Conduct [“CRPC”] Rules 4.2, 4.3, and subdivisions (b) and (c) of Rule 3.8) going into effect in November of this year. Among the questions discussed: When can prosecutors or law enforcement contact persons whose Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached? When can prosecutors or law enforcement re-contact persons whose Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been invoked during custodial interrogation? Does new CPRC rule 4.2 change the currently existing rule (CPRC 2-100) governing contact with represented persons in any significant way? And when can prosecutors communicate with charged but unrepresented persons and/or negotiate plea bargains with such persons?
2018-IPG-36 (PRIVACY INTERESTS IN RENTAL CARS (BYRD) & THE CURTILAGE (COLLINS))
June 15, 2018
2017-IPG-36 (PRIVACY INTERESTS IN RENTAL CARS (BYRD) & THE CURTILAGE (COLLINS))
This IPG (in conjunction with Points and Authorities) discusses two recent search and seizure cases from the United States Supreme Court. The first is a case addressing whether an “unauthorized” person who was allowed to drive a rental car rented by another has a reasonable expectation in the rental car (Byrd v. United States (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1518. The second is a case addressing whether the automobile exception allows for a warrantless entry onto the curtilage of a home to search a vehicle which officers have probable cause to believe is stolen (Collins v. Virginia 2018 WL 2402551).
2017-IPG-34 (HOPSON AND WASHINGTON)
September 21, 2017
2017-IPG-34 (HOPSON AND WASHINGTON)
This IPG discusses two cases involving the Confrontation Clause-related issues. The first is a case from the California Supreme Court that reads like a law school hypothetical highlighting the potential pitfalls of introduce statements of accomplices for purportedly non-hearsay purposes such as impeaching a defendant. It also provides an interesting discussion of the limits on what evidence can be introduced when a defendant “opens the door” to allowing in testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible over a Confrontation Clause objection. (People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424.) The second is a California appellate decision more solidly locking in the principle that the Aranda-Bruton rule does not apply when the statement of the co-defendant sought to be introduced in a joint trial is nontestimonial. (People v. Washington 2017 WL 3866413.)
2017-IPG-34_(HOPSON_AND_WASHINGTON) PDF VERSION
September 21, 2017
2017-IPG-34 (HOPSON AND WASHINGTON)
This IPG discusses two cases involving the Confrontation Clause-related issues. The first is a case from the California Supreme Court that reads like a law school hypothetical highlighting the potential pitfalls of introduce statements of accomplices for purportedly non-hearsay purposes such as impeaching a defendant. It also provides an interesting discussion of the limits on what evidence can be introduced when a defendant “opens the door” to allowing in testimony that would otherwise be inadmissible over a Confrontation Clause objection. (People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424.) The second is a California appellate decision more solidly locking in the principle that the Aranda-Bruton rule does not apply when the statement of the co-defendant sought to be introduced in a joint trial is nontestimonial. (People v. Washington 2017 WL 3866413.)
